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States use a variety of methods to forecast revenue estimates, from executive branch 
agencies to consensus groups incorporating representatives from multiple branches of 
government. Findings from the behavioral economics literature suggest that deliberative 
groups systematically produce relatively biased and inaccurate outputs. The literature also 
describes characteristics of deliberative groups most likely to perform best, finding that 
small groups and majoritarian groups perform better at estimative tasks requiring high 
levels of accuracy. This paper applies these predictions in a revenue estimation context, 
comparing between consensus and non-consensus states and within consensus states. 
Findings confirm hypotheses drawn from the behavioral economics literature: consensus 
groups performed less accurately on average than non-consensus groups; unanimous 
groups generated less accurate forecasts than groups operating under majoritarian rules; 
and small consensus groups produced more accurate forecasts than big consensus groups.   
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Accurate revenue predictions rely on predicting the future of the economy, an 
almost impossible task. States use a variety of methods in attempting to forecast a correct 
future revenue projection. Texas, for instance, relies the Office of the Comptroller, a state 
agency somewhat unusually headed by an official who wins statewide election, to 
produce a biennial revenue forecast binding on legislative budget writers.1 Other states 
rely on projections produced by expert-staffed agencies not subject to elections, 
governors’ offices, or state legislatures.2 One widespread method of projecting future 
state revenues is consensual revenue estimation, in which representatives from multiple 
branches of government or multiple agencies agree on a single forecast. Some states 
convene an independent board or commission, in which a group of political and expert 
non-political members determine revenue projections.  
The accuracy of a group’s decisionmaking process is crucial in this endeavor.  
When revenue estimators misfire, state legislators risk overspending beyond their 
budgets, or cutting unnecessary corners in state services. Pinpointing errors in existing 
revenue estimation practices and suggesting potentially superior alternatives could 
strengthen state-level governance and improve citizens’ quality of life.  
                                                 
1 TEX. CONST. Art. III, Sec. 49a.  
2 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES 31-




However, behavioral economists studying the accuracy of decisions made by 
groups find that deliberative groups frequently make systematic mistakes. Deliberative 
groups fall prey to common biases that prevent members from attaining and correctly 
analyzing the best information. As a result, empirical studies show that these groups have 
inferior levels of factual accuracy compared to other methods of generating factual 
determinations.  
Multimember groups, boards, and commissions responsible for estimating 
revenue operate as deliberative groups, and therefore may too experience group 
decisionmaking biases observed by behavioral economists. This possibility raises several 
questions. What testable hypotheses does behavioral economics generate about the 
accuracy of these groups’ forecasts? What kinds of institutional arrangements produce 
the most accurate group forecasts? What alternatives to deliberative groups could states 
use to generate revenue forecasts of superior accuracy? 
This paper will examine these questions. The first section gives an overview of 
the mechanics of state revenue estimation, as well as an introduction to some of the 
political, economic, and institutional determinants of forecast error. The second section 
discusses deliberative groups in the behavioral economics literature, and in particular the 
ways in which these groups amplify preexisting bias patterns. The third section generates 
a set of testable hypotheses regarding consensus budget estimation groups, a kind of 
deliberative group. Finally, the last section derives some workable suggestions for leaders 
managing forecasting processes.  
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I. State Revenue Estimation Processes 
States accomplish revenue estimation using a large variety of different entities 
operating under different decisional rules and calendars. Each variable of the process can 
influence the quality of the final product, the revenue estimate. Different arrangements 
influence states’ performance along several metrics, including not just the accuracy of the 
forecast but also levels of transparency and political acceptance.  
A. Overview of the Mechanics of State Revenue Estimation 
The internal process of developing the forecast vary between states. Most scholars 
divide states into a taxonomy with three categories: (1) separate forecasts by more than 
one branch of government, (2) executive forecasts by one or more executive branch 
agencies, or (3) consensus forecasts requiring multiple parts of government to come to an 
agreement on a single estimate.3 A 2014 report estimates that 13 states employ separate 
forecasts, 10 states use executive-branch forecasts, and 28 states operate under some form 
of consensus forecasting.4  
Scholars differ on the precise definition of “consensus.” The National Association 
of State Budget Officers (NASBO) defines this type of forecast as a projection 
“developed in agreement through an official forecasting group representing both the 
executive and legislative branches. 5 Other definitions include not only representatives 
                                                 
3 Elizabeth C. McNichol, Improving State Revenue Forecasting: Best Practices for a More 
Trusted and Reliable Revenue Estimate, CENTER. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 1-3 (Sep. 
4, 2014) https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-7-14sfp.pdf. 
4 Id. at 9-10.  
5 Donald J. Boyd & Lucy Dadayan, State Tax Revenue Forecasting Accuracy Technical Report, 
THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT 34 (Sep. 2014). 
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from executive and legislative branches but also experts and researchers from outside 
government. The Federation of Tax Administrators distinguishes between two types of 
consensus forecast groups: one type consisting of representatives of various state 
agencies, and a second type made up of executive and legislative appointees.6  
The annual Budget Processes in the States almanac compiled by NASBO contains 
more detailed descriptions of the entities performing revenue estimation. They survey the 
fifty states to determine the entities responsible for preparing and revising revenue 
estimates. They categorize states by whether they use one or more of the following to 
estimate revenue: a budget or revenue agency, the governor’s office, the state legislature, 
a board or commission, or some other type of entity, like as a governor-appointed state 
economist or group of university consultants.7 According to NASBO, approximately 21 
states also formally involved outside councils of economic advisors in their forecasting 
process.8    
B. Determinants of Forecasting Error 
Most studies show that state forecasters systematically underestimate state 
revenue.9 Evidence suggests that this error rate is due to conscious decisions on the part 
of estimators rather than technical shortcomings of economic models.10 Underestimation 
is a rational strategy for several possible reasons: as a hedge against economic 
                                                 
6 Id.  
7 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 2, at 31-38.  
8 Id. at 32.  
9 Daniel W. Williams & Thad D. Calabrese, The Status of Budget Forecasting, 2 J. OF PUB. AND 
NONPROFIT AFFAIRS 127, 130 (2016); see also Boyd and Dadayan, supra note 5, at 14. 
10 Williams & Calabrese, supra note 9, at 130.  
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uncertainty in the future; an ideologically motivated constraint on state spending; creating 
a stabilization cushion to forestall against future tax increases or service cuts; and so on.11 
In certain circumstances, underestimates may have pernicious consequences, especially if 
legislators choose to use their surplus on tax cuts or extra programs the state cannot 
afford in harder years.12 Oregon has an unusual kicker law requiring state lawmakers to 
return revenues to taxpayers above 2 percent of the forecast; the kicker law forced the 
state to refund taxpayers $1.1 billion from a previous strong fiscal cycle while 
simultaneously issuing budget cuts of $1.3 billion.13  
The precise magnitude and frequency of this underestimation is difficult to pin 
down. Previous studies have found that states underestimate on average approximately 
one to two percent of their revenue per fiscal cycle.14 A recent comprehensive review of 
twenty-seven years’ of revenue forecasting found that only five states regularly 
forecasted more than they collected; the other 45 states had median forecasts with 
positive errors.15 States not only give low estimates of their overall tax collections, they 
also underestimate individual components of their total taxes including sales tax revenue, 
personal income tax revenue, and corporate income tax revenue.16 US States share a 
propensity to underestimate revenue with sub-national units in other countries like 
                                                 
11 Id. at 130-31.  
12 Id. at 13-14.  
13 Id. at 15.  
14 Shanna Rose & Daniel L. Smith, Budget Slack, Institutions and Transparency, 72 PUB. 
ADMIN. R. 187, 188 (2011).  
15 Boyd & Dadayan, supra note 5, at 10-11. 
16 Id. at 8.  
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Switzerland and Canada, but differ from national governments in the United States and 
Europe, which more commonly forecast more revenue than collected.17 
States do at times overestimate revenues, usually in unusual circumstances like 
recessions. Estimators have an asymmetric incentive to avoid overestimation in 
anticipation of especially negative consequences: because many state budgets must 
balance, overestimates can force lawmakers to make targeted or across-the-board cuts, 
raise taxes, or spend down fiscal reserves.18 
In the past two decades, both positive and negative forecasting errors have 
increased, perhaps as a reflection of increasing volatility in a less predictable economy. In 
a 23-year time span from 1987-2009, the median state estimate error fell within 1 
percentage point only for two years.19 From 1987-2001, these errors were more modest, 
falling within four percentage points of the mark. However, the median error increased 
over four points for five of the eight years from 2002 to 2009.20 In 2009, the height of the 
recession, the median forecast was an extraordinary 10.9 percentage points over actual 
revenues, meaning half of all states performed even worse – in fact, four states returned 
an error greater than 25 percent.21 As expected, errors increase during recessionary years, 
                                                 
17 Williams & Calabrese, supra note 9, at 131 and 143. 
18 Id.   
19 THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES AND THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF 
GOVERNMENT, States’ Revenue Estimating: Cracks in the Crystal Ball 17 (March 2011), 
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/2011-03-01-states-revenue-estimating-
report.pdf.  
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 4.  
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but also during recent business expansion cycles.22 From 2002-2006 median errors 
showed great volatility, fluctuating 6 to 8 percentage points off the mark. Even from 
2010-2013, a period of steadier growth, median error stubbornly remained higher than 2 
percentage points.23 The next sections will explore factors demonstrated by the literature 
to affect revenue forecast errors.  
1. Political Factors 
A state’s political context can and does influence revenue estimates. Boylan 
(2008) found that revenue estimators overestimated state revenues by 1.2-2.2 percentage 
points during gubernatorial election years, in particular when the incumbent’s party faced 
serious threat.24 While most scholars studying forecast accuracy include controls for 
unified government and the party in power, the evidence that these factors seriously 
influence accuracy is mixed.25  
2. Economic Factors and Forecasting Methodology  
Forecast accuracy is influenced by the economic context as well as forecasters’ 
ability to interpret that context accurately. At the broadest level, the national economic 
climate affects state economies, and consequently state tax collections. While revenue 
estimators have always struggled with predicting recessions, economic volatility and 
                                                 
22 Id. at 11-12. 
23 Boyd & Dadayan, supra note 5, at 8.  
24 Richard T. Boylan, Political Distortions in State Forecasts, 136 PUB. CHOICE 411, 419-20 
(2008); see also George A. Krause & James W. Douglas, Organizational Structure and the 
Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commissions’ 
Revenue Forecasts in the American States, 57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 135, 143 (2013).  
25 Rose & Smith, supra note 14, at 190.  
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unpredictability have increased progressively during each of the last three recessionary 
cycles.26  Generally, most studies of state revenue forecasting control for macroeconomic 
variables including changes in unemployment, inflation, and personal income growth on 
a state and national level.27  
Most forecasters use a three-step process: first, projecting nationwide economic 
trends; second, developing statewide economic projections with a model incorporating 
nationwide projections; and third, feeding state economic projections into econometric 
models of the state’s tax revenues, taking into account the tax base and laws.28 Estimators 
use a host of methodological tools, both quantitative and non-quantitative, to extrapolate 
into the future, including time series, causal and econometric modeling, simulations, 
Delphi methods, nominal techniques, and their own judgments.29 However, even highly 
sophisticated modeling and tools sometimes do not generate additional explanatory 
power: “[I]mportant parts of the forecasting literature question the value added by 
attempting complex causal modeling of the variable to be forecast and propose that naïve 
                                                 
26 John L. Mikesell & Justin M. Ross, State Revenue Forecasts and Political Acceptance: The 
Value of Consensus Forecasting in the Budget Process, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 188, 189  (2014); 
THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES AND THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 3. 
27 See, e.g., Boylan, supra note 23, at 417; Krause & Douglas, supra note 23, at 143; George A. 
Krause, David E. Lewis, & James W. Douglas, Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, 
and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Executive Branch Revenue 
Forecasts in the American States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 770, 781 (2006).  
28 Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 189; THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES AND THE NELSON 
A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 17.  
29 Williams & Calabrese, supra note 9, at 131 and 136-39. 
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models do just as well, if not better, and are less prone to interference with the forecast 
result.”30   
The structure of state tax laws and the anticipated mix of tax revenue seriously 
increases the difficulty of revenue forecasters’ jobs. Frequently, revenue estimators must 
forecast multiple revenue streams for each source of tax revenue. 31 The three most 
important sources of revenue come from personal income tax, sales tax, and corporate 
income taxes, which together constitute on average 72 percent of a state’s budget; a 2014 
analysis showed that other sources of revenue made up more than half of a state’s total 
revenue in only six states.32 Each revenue source can inject volatility or unpredictability 
into the process. In particular, states in which income, sales, and corporate taxes 
constitute a minority of total revenue experience greater volatility, as do states with an 
over-reliance on a corporate tax.33 
3. Institutional Factors: Generally 
The rules and laws of the budget process have a significant effect on the 
forecasting accuracy. The nature of the state’s fiscal rules and laws matter, as do the 
nature of unwritten rules and norms, as so many revenue estimating committees operate 
on an informal basis.  
Several institutional factors influence the accuracy of a revenue forecast. A 
variety of tax and expenditure limits tie appropriators’ hands and place additional 
                                                 
30 Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 189. 
31 Id. at 21-28.  
32 Boyd & Dadayan, supra note 5, at 6.  
33 Id. at 6-9.  
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pressure on tax collections: laws limiting taxes based on factors including income, 
inflation, and population growth; and balanced budget rules.34 Balanced budget rules may 
require the budgets that governors submit to legislators or that legislatures adopt not to 
exceed actual revenues.35 These types rules can incentivize legislators to err 
conservatively in forecasting revenues, as over-forecasting revenues may force legislators 
to take unpopular measures like cutting services or hiking taxes. Rose and Smith (2011) 
find a significant relationship between balanced budget rules and lawmakers’ tendency to 
underestimate revenue, as did Krause, Lewis, and Douglas, who tested whether the state 
legislature was required to pass a balanced budget.36 Other policies, like economic 
stabilization funds or surplus general funds, create a sense of fiscal “slack,” leading 
estimators to worry less about maintaining an underforecast.37  
A binding budget requirement can lead to increased incentive to over-forecast, as 
lawmakers become wary of a locked-in budget.38 The fiscal calendar differs from state to 
state—some states use annual budgets while others use biennial; some states estimate 
revenue as often as six or more times a year while others only release an official estimate 
once every two years; some states project out well beyond the current fiscal cycle while 
others do not.39 In general, research finds that errors increase the farther ahead a forecast 
                                                 
34 Rose & Smith, supra note 14, at 190.  
35 James M. Poterba, State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and 
Policies, 102 J. OF POL. ECON. 799, 803 (1994). 
36 Rose & Smith, supra note 14, at 193; Krause, Lewis, & Douglas, supra note 26, at 283.   
37 Rose & Smith, supra note 14, at 189.  
38 Krause, Lewis, & Douglas, supra note 26, at 283.   
39 Id. 
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is issued from the start of the forecast cycle, a finding that negatively impacts states using 
biennial budgets, since forecasters must determine revenue estimates for the second year 
over a year in advance.40 More frequent forecasts do not necessarily yield more accurate 
estimates.41 
4. Institutional Factors: Consensus Forecasting 
Consensus-based forecasting, in which representatives of the executive and 
legislative branches of government join to agree on an estimate, is at the center of a long 
normative debate. Scholars differ on the value of consensus groups. A Pew-Rockefeller 
Institute study found no clear evidence that consensus-based processes produced more 
accurate estimates.42 However, others extol the virtues of consensus-based programming, 
with a report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities describing consensus 
forecasting as a “common-sense best practice.”43  
Consensus forecasting may not add substantially to accuracy, but proponents 
claim that consensus-based methods produce greater political buy-in, making legislators 
more likely to abide by estimates produced by the process.44 Proponents also claim that 
                                                 
40 Boyd & Dadayan, supra note 5, at 27, 33. 
41 Id.  
42 THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES AND THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 5.  
43 McNichol, supra note 3, at 1. 
44 Id. at 4; see also Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 191.  
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consensus forecasting is correlated with an increase a state’s credit rating, lowering its 
interest rates.45  
 In terms of optimal design for a consensus group, Krause and Douglas (2013) 
assert that consensus groups have a trade-off between levels of diversity and group size. 
They claim, in other words, that as a group increases in size and increases in diversity, its 
output quality decreases, but if the size increases but diversity decreases a more optimal 
bargain is struck.46   
  
                                                 
45 Jeffrey M. Tebbs, Breaking the Stalemate: A Proposal for a Consensus Revenue Forecasting 
Process, CONNECTICUT VOICES FOR CHILDREN 1 
http://www.ctvoices.org/sites/default/files/bud09revenueforecasting.pdf  (March 2009).  
46 Krause & Douglas, supra note 23, at 139. 
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II. Group Decisionmaking in Behavioral Economics Literature 
Behavioral economists have studied group decisionmaking in order to determine 
when and what types of groups make accurate or successful decisions. Much of this study 
has focused on one type of group: the deliberative group. Deliberative groups are here 
defined as groups that “[use] deliberation and [ask] for the reasoned exchange of facts, 
ideas, and opinions.”47 These groups stand in contrast to individual decisionmakers, or 
groups that do not do not permit consultation with other group members before coming to 
a decision (e.g., opinion polls).  
Deliberative groups’ output may be biased by a number of systematic fallacies. 
The way these fallacies affect groups’ output depends on the nature of task the group is 
called on to complete. The first section will outline a taxonomy of deliberative group 
tasks, and argue that revenue estimating groups complete estimation tasks. The second 
section will describe how group fallacies identified by behavioral economists affect 
groups’ accuracy in completing estimation tasks.   
A.  Taxonomy of Deliberative Group Tasks 
Deliberative groups can perform multiple types of cognitive assessments using 
several response formats. Stasser and Dietz-Uhler developed a method for categorizing 
groups according to the nature of the response the group must produce (see Table 1).48 
                                                 
47 Cass R. Sunstein. Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information 
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 963 (2005). 
48 Garold Stasser & Beth Dietz-Uhler, Collective Choice Judgment, and Problem Solving, in 
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF GROUP PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 34 (Michael A. Hogg and 
R. Scott Tindale, eds., 2001). 
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Selecting groups must chose two or more responses, while rating tasks involve 
determining a value along a continuum.49 An example of a selective group is a contract 
management team assembling a list of acceptable vendors. An example of a rating task is 
a group of managers determining the best vendor to supply technology products from that 
list. These two categories are not wholly distinct, as part of selection entails rating 
individual options.  
The second dimension of this schema is a continuum running between intellective 
tasks that correspond to an objectively correct answer or factual determination, and a 
judgmental task that has a 
subjective, not objective, 
answer.50 Satisfying at least some 
of these conditions suggests the 
group’s task is more intellective than judgmental: (1) group members share an inference 
system or procedural knowledge to determine the right answer; (2) the system of 
inference has enough information to determine a right answer; (3) individuals who know 
the right answer must be capable and willing to demonstrate how they arrive at that 
answer; and (4) those who do not know the right answer must accept experts’ 
demonstration of correctness.51  
                                                 
49 Id. at 32.  
50 Id. at 33.  
51 Id.  
 Response Format 
 Select Rate 




Table 1. Group Categorization Schema. 
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For instance, deliberative polling groups perform a judgmental task. The 
deliberative polling technique developed by Fishkin entails a representative jury of peers 
making a determination on a policy area, like whether to adopt a new currency or how to 
regulate utilities.52 Because group members must make a subjective judgment based on 
their values and ideology, many possible “right” answers may exist, and members may 
not share the same system of inference.  
Revenue estimation falls within the “Estimation” cell of the schema in Figure 1, 
as a rating group performing a mainly intellective task. These groups must rate, because 
they are responsible for returning a single revenue estimate figure from a continuum of 
possible revenues. They also must return a single, objectively right answer: the estimate, 
in theory, should correspond as closely as possible to the actual revenue taken in by the 
state. In contrast, elected officials are then responsible for the task of writing the budget, 
which is a value-judgment task more likely to fall in the “judgment” or “choice” cells. 
State budgets are political documents, with potentially multiple right answers depending 
on how lawmakers weight competing priorities. 
Deliberative groups exhibit a special susceptibility to certain biases. As a subset 
of deliberative groups, behavioral psychologists have developed theoretical models and 
empirical models specific to groups performing estimation tasks. Intellective tasks like 
estimation permit scholars to explore the quality of group decisionmaking empirically by 
measuring group factual determination against the objectively correct outcome. This 
                                                 
52 Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, & Roger Jowell, Considered Opinions: Deliberative 
Polling in Britain, 32 BRITISH J. OF POL. SCI. 455, 461-62 (2002).  
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section will focus on the systematic biases exhibited by deliberative groups, particularly 
with reference to estimation tasks.  
B.  Deliberative Groups Biases 
Deliberative groups exhibit systematic patterns of error biasing the accuracy of 
their factual determinations. Sunstein (2015) describes two forces generating these errors: 
group members misconstruing the informational signals sent by others, and social 
pressures to keep quiet about contrary viewpoints.53 These two forces in turn create four 
general types of problems: (1) cascade effects, in which groups blindly follow the lead of 
those speaking first; (2) amplification of the errors made by individual group members; 
(3) group polarization in favor of a more extreme version of a belief already previously 
held by group members; and (4) overemphasis on the group’s common knowledge at the 
expense of hidden (but crucial) knowledge.54  
Generally, each of these errors relates back to the group’s inability to draw out the 
most important information, as well as shortcomings in the group’s analysis of its limited 
information. These mechanisms explain why deliberative groups come to wrong factual 
determinations – a crucial challenge for groups attempting to project accurate revenue 
forecasts. This section will define each error with greater detail, and identify observable 
variables affecting a group’s propensity to fall prey to each of these errors.  
                                                 
53 CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE 
GROUPS SMARTER 22-23 (2015).  
54 Id. at 23-24.  
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Cascade effects, the first type of group error, occur when individuals act against 
their internal, independent judgments to side with the first opinions they observe others 
express.55 Various types of cascades exist. In informational cascades, group members fall 
in line with the first opinion expressed because they assume the first member to speak has 
superior information.56 In these cascades, every member fails to disclose their internal 
independent judgment, as well as any private information they hold.57 In reputational 
cascades, a similar effect occurs because other group members do not want to lose face 
by disagreeing with the first opinion.58  
 Several variables may affect the propensity of groups to experience cascades, 
including the size of the group. One study attributed the reason smaller juries have the 
same mistrial rates as larger juries to information cascades. Because information cascades 
exert stronger effects in larger groups, argue Luppi and Parisi, larger juries actually had 
inflated rates of unanimity.59 Cascades may also rely on the deliberation methods used by 
the group – do members formulate and submit their independent judgments for the entire 
group to evaluate? In addition, decision rules affect the existence of cascades – compared 
                                                 
55 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 999-1004.  
56 Id. at 999-1000.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 1002.  
59 Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Jury Size and the Hung-Jury Paradox, 42 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 2, 399, 409 (June 2013). 
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to consensus or super-majority requirements, group that operate by majority rule exhibit 
almost no cascade effects.60 
Second, a group setting can amplify individuals’ patterns of misjudgment. To take 
one example, individuals show susceptibility to the representativeness heuristic, in which 
the apparent resemblance or similarity of two events will affect assessments of 
probability.61 Individuals exhibit many other types of heuristics as well. While 
individuals will make certain predictable errors of judgment, groups will often operate to 
amplify at least some types of errors.  
 Some studies suggest that the extent to which a group amplifies individual errors 
depends on the mix of members in the group. Groups that amplify individual errors 
usually do so under the influence of logically or statistically irrelevant information, or 
because relevant information lacks influence.62 Group members’ individual susceptibility 
biases may predict the group’s susceptibility as a whole:  
“[W]hen a bias arises due to a widely shared judgmental heuristic or 
belief system, group interaction will enhance the bias. In contrast, when 
the underlying cognitive process is less widely shared and groups are 
likely to contain one or more members who are not susceptible to the 
                                                 
60 Reid Hastie & Tatsuya Kameda, The Robust Beauty of Majority Rules in Group Decisions, 
112 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 494-508, 495 (2005).  
61 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 990.  
62 Stasser & Dietz-Uhler, supra note 43, at 49.  
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bias, the group interaction may provide an opportunity for more accurate 
members to persuade (or correct) less accurate members.”63  
More cognitively heterogenous groups have a greater chance of canceling out individual 
errors – at least, if those errors are not correlated. Individual errors with uncorrelated 
error terms include heuristics like the egocentric bias, in which individual decisionmakers 
believe that others think and reason as they do.64 Individual errors with correlated errors 
present a much greater danger to groups, contributing to excessive group bias. Biases 
exaggerated by group dynamics include the representativeness heuristic, framing effects, 
overconfidence, and the sunk-cost fallacy.65  
The third type of error is group polarization, a phenomenon connected to group 
cascades, which occur when members of a deliberative group end the deliberative process 
holding a more extreme version of the preconceived notions they initially held.66 This 
phenomenon is demonstrated most clearly in judgmental tasks, in which a group must 
return a subjective determination, e.g., panels of judges or juries returning a verdict.67 
Behaviorists propose three main mechanisms to explain why groups polarize: (1) the 
initial position will, by nature of being first, have more arguments in its favor, lending 
numerical weight to the first opinions adopted; (2) members bow towards the initial 
opinions aired by other members out of deference to social pressures and perceived early 
                                                 
63 Id.  
64 SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 48, at 54. 
65 Id. at 52-53.  
66 Id. at 77. 
67 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1004-05.  
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consensus; and (3) the most extreme members will have greater confidence in their 
views, and therefore speak more persuasively.68  
The group polarization concept is harder to apply in an estimation task than a 
judgment task. To begin with, group polarization does not predict whether the group will 
return an accurate answer more or less frequently, since the group’s final decision 
depends on the initial positions adopted by its members – this hinders the empirical 
testing of this phenomenon. In addition, in a setting where members’ greatest concerns 
are accuracy instead of ideology, no connection may exist between members’ extreme 
positions and their confidence in their conclusions.  
Persuasive arguments theory suggests how this mechanism might work in an 
estimative setting. This theory predicts that, because individuals do not have access to 
full information, that “polarization occurs in the direction of the alternative for which the 
greatest number of arguments have been made.”69 Numerically counting the arguments in 
favor and against a lower or higher rating could predict the outcome adopted by the group 
– however, this requires a detailed level of access to the group’s deliberative process.  
Fourth, hidden profiles and common knowledge may adversely impact the quality 
of a group’s output, failing share information as efficiently as possible to come to the 
most accurate conclusion possible. Groups do not aggregate information correctly when 
they disproportionately weight knowledge shared by all group members, a bias known as 
                                                 
68 Id.  
69 Glen Whyte & James K. Sebenius, The Effect of Multiple Anchors on Anchoring in Individual 
and Group Judgment, 69 ORG. BEH. AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 75, 78 (January 1997) 
 21 
the “common knowledge effect.”70 These groups do not correctly take into account the 
accurate information privately held by a few individuals, “hidden profiles” obscured by 
the common knowledge effect.71 Studies suggest that the larger the group size, the more 
likely the group will exhibit the common knowledge effect by discussing shared 
information more and non-shared information less.72  
Observers of this phenomenon suggests two explanations. First, similar to group 
polarization, the group may discuss common knowledge more frequently, numerically 
speaking, than hidden profile information, giving it greater weight.73 Second, shared 
knowledge affects individuals’ judgments, which in turn affect the group’s judgment.74  
C. Deliberative Group Strengths and Strategies for Improvement  
The previous section delineated a long list of blind spots exhibited by deliberative 
groups, particularly groups performing estimation tasks. Despite their record for error, 
deliberative groups do have certain desirable attributes. Deliberative groups also 
demonstrate unique strengths, and may be amenable to changes significantly improving 
the quality of group decisions.  
One strength of a deliberative groups is in conferring democratic legitimacy on an 
outcome – in other words, the act of deliberation can form a democratic end in itself, 
rather than as a means to that end. Dryzek (2001) conceptualizes legitimate democratic 
                                                 
70 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 994.  
71 Id.  
72 Garold Stasser et al., Information Sampling in Structured and Unstructured Discussions of  
Three- and Six-Person Groups, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 67, 73 (1989). 
73 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 998. 
74 Id.  
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outcomes as decisions that are “resonant” with one or several competing, dispersed, 
broad-based discourses in a deliberative society.75 Deliberative processes help group 
members rhetorically justify a decision to other members of society, by drawing on 
shared discursive frameworks to explain and rationalize decisions.  
This concept is most clearly illustrated by groups performing judgmental (as 
opposed to intellective76) tasks, which require an application of shared values to 
determine a subjectively correct answer. One such group is a jury in a criminal or civil 
trial, in which the jury’s verdict is lent legitimacy partly from the deliberative, 
justificatory method used to determine its decision. Another such group is Fishkin’s 
deliberative polling method, in which a small, representative group of citizens determine 
through deliberation an ideal, binding policy solution (e.g., the desirability of 
imprisonment to combat crime).77  
Even for groups performing estimative task requiring accuracy, deliberative group 
decisionmaking processes can generate a valuable legitimacy. Mikesell and Ross (2014) 
illustrate how this legitimacy operates in a state revenue forecasting context. They note 
that a consensus-based revenue estimating process incorporating several relevant political 
players in Indiana generated what they describe as a vital “acceptance” of budget 
estimates:  
                                                 
75 John S. Dryzek, Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. THEORY 651, 
661-62 (2001).  
76 See Table 1.  
77 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1009. 
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The process installed … by agreement and not by statute … seeks to 
produce an accepted forecast that neutralizes political influences (both real 
and accused) on the forecast by involving all branches and both political 
parties. […] [A]cceptance of the fiscal baseline is a test of the forecast 
process, just as accuracy is critical for the fiscal baseline. In the years since 
the development of the Indiana consensus revenue forecasting approach, 
there have never been dueling forecasts produced within the General 
Assembly. The Indiana legislature and governor have always accepted the 
forecast coming from the [revenue estimating body] as the one used for 
determining appropriations. As a result, it served as a hard budget 
constraint.78 
The deliberative and broad-based forecasting process induces acceptance of a budget 
recognized as legitimate, in the same way a verdict produced by a representative, 
deliberative jury has a broad legitimacy in society.  
Legitimacy can salvage the value of deliberative groups. However, as described in 
part IIB, these groups still experience systematic errors of reasoning, distorting the 
accuracy of their outcomes. Behavioral scholars have proposed some solutions 
ameliorating the worst of these errors. Many of the heuristics worsening the quality of 
deliberative group outcomes are rooted in two sources: misconstrued informational 
signals and social pressures in favor of conformity.  
                                                 
78 Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 200 (italics original).  
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Various group techniques ameliorate these sources of bias. For instance, the 
“nominal group” technique encourages members of the group to submit anonymous 
recommendations and then serially discuss these recommendations.79 Anonymity limits 
social pressures to conform behind the best-regarded expert. Multiple rounds generate 
multiple opportunities to disclose information, encouraging group members to use the 
best information available and discouraging hidden profiles.  
A similar method of making decisions is the Delphic judgment technique, in 
which anonymous panels of experts contribute their best estimates over several rounds, 
eventually converging on a group consensus around the best answer.80 Deliberation 
between group members is typically highly structured, with members’ individual 
conclusions potentially mediated by a group facilitator, and the final judgment is a 
statistical aggregation of members’ individual judgments.81 Because this method 
incorporates less deliberation, these groups may experience a lessening of the social 
pressures leading to group polarization – the most vocal and confident members are 
muted by the mediation of feedback.   
Altering group membership to include more or stronger voices from people with 
access to the correct answer tends to increase group accuracy. When a person confidently 
                                                 
79 For a definition and example of nominal group techniques, see P. Delp et al., Nominal Group 
Technique, SYSTEM TOOLS FOR PROJECT PLANNING, International Development Institute, 
http://www.aucd.net/docs/urc/Leadership_Institute/Subsequent%20Leadership%20Institute%20
Materials/Nominal%20Group%20Technique.pdf. 
80 Gene Rowe & George Wright, Expert Opinions in Forecasting: The Role of the Delphi 
Technique, in PRINCIPLES OF FORECASTING, 125, 125 (J.S. Armstrong, ed., 2001).  
81 Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1018.  
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relates a self-affirming or clearly correct answer (e.g., estimating distance between 
London and Paris), the group will likely accept that answer.82 Social pressures likely 
induce conformity in favor of the most confident person, who seems to act on expertise or 
prior knowledge. 
D. Alternatives to Deliberative Groups 
The second set of solutions concerns jettisoning the deliberative group structure 
altogether in favor of alternative decisionmaking structures promoted by behavioral 
scientists. One of these alternatives is the “statistical group,” or polling a random 
selection of people and taking the mean answer. Another alternative is the “information 
market,” in which many members contribute individually held information to a final 
product (e.g., a Wikipedia article or a market price).83  
Statistical groups consistently show greater accuracy than deliberative groups,84 in 
part because individual propensity for error is canceled out rather than exaggerated 
through deliberation. In a meta-analysis of over a dozen studies testing the factual 
accuracy of group decisionmaking, Gigone and Hastie (1997) concluded that deliberative 
groups rendered decisions approximately as accurate as the mean of all members polled: 
“For the most part, group judgments tend to be more accurate than the judgments of 
typical individuals, approximately equal in accuracy to the mean judgments of their 
                                                 
82 Id. at 1007.  
83 Id. at 1022-23.  
84 See, e.g., id. at 971.  
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members, and less accurate than the judgments of their most accurate member.”85 This 
finding makes some sense: statistical groups combine each individual’s best information, 
without the distorting social pressures of deliberation.  
Information markets work similarly, in that individuals aggregate information 
without the distorting social pressures of deliberation. In fact, some information markets 
may encourage an even higher quality of information – an investor who acts on her guess 
at the true value of a stock by buying or selling likely has a higher degree of confidence 




                                                 
85 Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments, 121 
PSYCH. BULLETIN 149, 153 (1997).  
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III. Applying Behavioral Economics insights to State Revenue Estimation 
Insights from behavioral economics may help explain which state revenue 
estimation processes perform best in terms of accuracy, particularly for states relying on 
deliberative groups to determine a revenue estimate. In revenue estimation, the 
consensus-based process fits most neatly within the category of an estimative deliberative 
group: members must perform a rating task, agreeing on a single revenue estimate to 
begin the budgeting cycle.   
A. Generating Hypotheses 
1. Comparing Use of Consensus Groups to Other Methods 
According to behaviorists’ account, deliberative groups magnify individuals’ 
biases to generate less accurate answers as a collective.86 Deliberative groups also fare 
worse than other methods of agglomerating individuals’ judgments, including statistical 
sampling and information markets. Many states incorporate a strong deliberative aspect 
to consensual revenue estimation methods, as illustrated by this description of Indiana’s 
process: 
[T]he forecasting group does not merely bring together competing forecasts 
developed by the representatives on the committee but also involves the 
forecasting group in developing the methodology employed to create the 
forecast. In contrast, for instance, the Michigan process produces consensus 
                                                 
86 See Section IIB on amplification of individual biases.  
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from alternative economic and revenue forecasts…, with each independently 
developed [by a separate agency].87 
The Indiana Revenue Forecast Technical Committee resembles a deliberative group, as 
its members do spend time in discourse with each other before submitting their final 
recommendation. This time spent in discussion is an open opportunity for group members 
to become more polarized or amplify others’ biases.  
Hypothesis 1: Consensus-based deliberative groups perform less accurately than 
non-consensus based groups, including states in which executive branches or 
separate branches forms of estimation.  
2. Comparing States Within the Consensus Group Category 
Section IIB identified several relevant variables that could affect the performance 
of a deliberative group detrimentally, whether by increasing social pressures or by 
suppressing high-quality information. As described in that section, deliberative groups 
are more likely to experience an informational cascade in larger groups and when groups 
require unanimity rather than majority agreement. Individual biases are less likely to be 
amplified when groups are more cognitively heterogeneous; similarly, groups are more 
likely to over-weight common knowledge when a large number of group members come 
from a similar background.  
If these insights are applicable to the revenue estimating context, then the size of 
forecasting groups, the makeup of the groups, and the decisional rules they operate under 
                                                 
87 Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 195.  
 29 
matter. This theory was explored by Krause and Douglas (2013). They hypothesized that 
the forecasting consensus group would improve in accuracy as the group’s diversity and 
size became increasingly negatively correlated.88 In other words, groups that were large 
and extremely diverse would not perform well; nor would small and homogenous groups. 
Only when groups had mixed characteristics—large but homogenous, or small but 
diverse—would the group’s performance improve. They argued that, as groups increased 
in size and heterogeneity, the variety eventually imposes collaboration costs on group 
members that are too high. Krause and Douglas built and tested a regression analysis that 
controlled for four different types of diversity, the size of the group, the decisional rule 
the group used (e.g., unanimity, majority, etc.) and so on. The decisional rules did not test 
as statistically significant, but the variables testing the interaction between various 
measures of group diversity and group size did.89  
Hypothesis 2:  Revenue estimation groups operating under majoritarian rules will 
produce more accurate revenue estimates than groups with unanimity voting rules.  
Deliberative groups exacerbate patterns of bias by increased social pressure. Strict 
decisional rules, including unanimity requirements, may increase social pressure on 
members of the group who would otherwise raise important issues, which in turn may 
increase the chances of bias amplification through pressures like group polarization or 
cascade effects. While Krause and Douglas did not find statistically significant effects in 
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89 Id. at 143.  
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their regression models, this descriptive analysis will be more exploratory in nature, and 
will not claim to find a causal relationship.  
Hypothesis 3: The relative accuracy of revenue estimation will depend on group 
size, with larger groups more likely to produce larger error terms than smaller 
groups.  
As outlined in Section IIB, larger deliberative groups are more susceptible to 
experiencing information cascades, in which the group inefficiently uses the information 
it has at hand. This test differs slightly from the Krause and Douglas test, who mainly 
sought to test the interaction between group size and various measures of diversity.   
B. Data and Methods 
Previous analyses have shown that state-level revenue estimators exhibit a well-
established conservative preference to underestimate the amount of tax revenue in a given 
budget cycle, generally for political reasons.90 This presents some difficulty: how can 
forecast error attributable to political pressures be separated from forecast error 
attributable to forecasters’ collective mistake?  
One way to do so might be to examine how revenue estimators forecast in 
unusually difficult circumstances. In particular, the period immediately preceding the 
onset of a recession presents great difficulty for forecasters, as evidenced by substantial 
overestimation errors during the last two recessions. Projecting just enough—or too 
little—in tax revenues “might be a sign of fiscal stress because these estimated revenues 
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are needed to cover immediate spending... These errors may not reflect political 
decisions.”91 In normal years, forecasters’ error terms are small and positively biased, 
indicating a preference for underestimating.92 But in recent recessions, state forecasters 
not only produce negative forecast errors, the absolute value of those errors has 
substantially increased as well. In addition, more states misestimate recessions—the 
proportion of states overestimating revenue increased from 25 percent in the 1990-92 
recession to 45 percent in 2001-2003 to over 70 percent by 2009.93  
Ideally, revenue forecasters in deliberative groups should outperform mechanistic 
economic models because of their capability to judge the future and their access to high-
quality information about economic trends. For instance, in explaining their measure of 
forecast difficulty, Boyd and Dadayan (2014) note that, in contrast to their naïve model 
drawing only on available economic data and past trends, human forecasters should have 
an advantage in determining turning points and changes in the economy’s direction: 
“Because revenue forecasters read the newspapers, talk to economic forecasters, and 
make use of a wide variety of information sources that cannot easily fit into uniform 
models, they are likely to be more accurate than our naïve model.”94  
For these reasons, the best way to assess the quality of state revenue forecasters’ 
work is to focus on the size of their forecast errors during recessionary years. Because 
                                                 
91 Id. at 131.  
92 Boyd & Dadayan, supra note 5, at 15. 
93 THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES AND THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 52, at 8.  
94 Boyd & Dadayan, supra note 5, at 14.  
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state forecasters generally attempt to underestimate tax revenues for political reasons, 
years in which they produce negative errors represent a deviation from the norm. High-
performing revenue estimating groups should have the capability to gather high-quality 
information from a variety of sources, as described by Boyd and Dadayan, to anticipate a 
possible downturn. State forecasters with the lowest error rates during those years 
demonstrate an unusually high level of accuracy.  
In addition, state forecasters have particular difficulty in estimating certain 
especially volatile revenue streams. Three sources of revenue make up 72 percent of the 
average state’s total revenue: personal income tax, sales tax, and corporate income taxes. 
Of these three, the corporate income tax consistently demonstrates the greatest volatility. 
State forecasters mis-estimated corporate income tax revenues by an average of 1.3 
percent with a standard deviation of 22.6 percent, almost three times as much variation as 
for the personal income tax and 5 times as much for the sales tax.95 Individual and 
collective discernment and judgment is key for measuring volatile revenues in uncertain 
circumstances.  
Dependent variables. States self-report forecasts and revenues through the twice-
annual Fiscal Survey of the States report, collected by NASBO and the National 
Governor’s Association. This analysis will draw on reported projections and collections 
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of the corporate income tax from the Fall 2007 report to the Spring 2011 report, to 
coincide with the beginning and end of the most recent recession.96 
A frequently used method to measure forecasting error is mean absolute 
percentage error (MAPE), where Ft refers to the forecasted projection and At refers to the 
actual revenue projection in time t97: 
 







MAPE measures the magnitude of the difference between the forecasted and actual 
revenues, but does not show bias as clearly. A better measure for understanding the 
direction in which forecasters err is the mean percentage error (MPE)98:  
 







The MPE becomes negative when revenues are less than forecast and positive when 
revenue exceeds forecasts. Figure 1 demonstrates this graphically: at the height of the 
                                                 
96 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS & THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS 
ASSOCIATION, The Fiscal Survey of States (Fall 2008-Spring 2011) 
https://www.nasbo.org/mainsite/reports-data/fiscal-survey-of-states/fiscal-survey-archives.  
97 Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 196; see also Boyd & Dadayan, supra note 5, at 6.  
98 Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 196. 
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recession in 2009, forecasters issued projections 5-25 percent above actual revenues for 
each of the three major tax streams. The chart also illustrates the varying levels of 
unpredictability for each of the three funding sources, with sales tax forecasts tracking 
more closely with actual revenues than corporate income tax forecasts.  
 
Figure 1. Mean Percentage Error for Tax Revenue Streams, 2008-2011 
Independent Variables: Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 requires a comparison 
between the relative performance of states using consensus groups for revenue 
estimation, states in which separate branches generate estimates, and states where the 
executive branch alone issues projections. Of the 45 states that collect corporate income 
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estimation. The remaining 12 states were not unambiguously classifiable as one of those 
three categories.99  
Independent Variables: Hypothesis 2. Krause and Douglas (2013) gathered 
decisional rules for twenty-six states operating under the consensual group system. Each 
state was categorized as either a “unanimity” state or a “majority” state.100  
Independent Variables: Hypothesis 3. Krause and Douglas (2013) also collected 
information on the panel size used by twenty-six consensus group states. The size of 
panels ranged from 3 to 9, with Delaware as an outlier with a 30-person consensus group 
panel.101  
Method. The MAPE and MPE measures provide a rudimentary way of evaluating 
the accuracy of forecasters’ projections. However, forecasters’ true performance remains 
obscured by noise. A common method of measuring forecast difficulty is to compare 
forecasters’ performance against naïve forecast models using simple decision rules.102 
Following the practice of Mikesell and Ross (2014),103 these two simple models provide a 
yardstick against which to measure state forecasters’ performance: 
1. A basic lag model setting the state’s forecast Ft at time t equal to the state’s actual 
revenue At-1 in time t-1: 
F𝑡 = A𝑡−1 
                                                 
99 See Appendix A. 
100 Krause & Douglas, supra note 23, at 140.  
101 Id.  
102 Boyd & Dadayan, supra note 5, at 12-15; Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 196-97.  
103 Id.  
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2. A simple trend model setting the state’s forecast Ft at time t equal to a univariate 
regression of observed values:  
F𝑡 = β0 +  β1𝑡 
The next section will set out the states’ average MAPE and MPE forecast errors in 
calculating the corporate income tax, measure the forecast errors against the two simple 
forecast models, and break out certain sub-groups of interest.  
C. Analysis 
Between 2008 and 2011, state governments experienced an extraordinary amount 
of revenue volatility. Unlike other recessions, all three major sources of revenue—sales 
tax, personal income tax, and corporate income tax—declined simultaneously. Table 3104 
shows the extent of the downturn; none of the MPE descriptive statistics carries a positive 
sign, indicating that forecasters profoundly overpredicted revenues. Some states did not 
fare so poorly. North Dakota, for  
instance, averaged strong 
negative MPEs in all tax 
revenue categories for this 
period, with the lowest 
average annual sales tax 
MPE in the nation at -6.94 
percent. The example of 
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Mean MPE 3.30% 3.42% 10.09% 
Standard Deviation 3.24% 4.50% 16.51% 
75th Percentile 4.39% 6.08% 16.23% 
Median MPE 3.70% 3.89% 6.34% 
25th Percentile  2.30% 2.05% 1.73% 
n 318 291 313 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Tax Revenue Streams, 2007-
2011. 
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North Dakota illustrates the value of comparing state forecaster error with error from 
naïve models—the negative error rates do not reflect state forecasters’ perspicacity so 
much as an exogenous, unforeseen economic boom precipitated by technological 
advancements in energy extraction.105  
 Focusing in on the revenue stream of interest, the corporate income tax, 
demonstrates some of the difficulty of forecasting during this time. Not only was the 
magnitude of corporate income tax errors large, but measures of variance also indicate a 
very wide range of error values. Half of states’ average corporate income tax errors 
during this period ranged between 1.73 and 16.23 percent, a very wide spread indicating 
estimators’ relative unpreparedness for declining tax receipts.  
 Finally, Table 4106 demonstrates how comparing forecasters’ projections with 
naïve models helps isolate forecasters’ value in terms of accuracy. Columns (1) and (2) 
show two types of forecaster errors, MPE and MAPE. MPE can carry a positive sign, 
indicating that forecasters’ projections overestimated tax revenue, or a negative sign, 
indicating that estimators issued an underestimate of tax revenues, as reflected in North  
Dakota. MAPE, in contrast, is an absolute 
                                                 
105 Jack Healey, Built Up By Oil Boom, North Dakota Now Has an Emptier Feeling, N.Y. TIMES 
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106 Author calculations; see Appendix B; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS 
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value measure reflecting the magnitude but not the bias of the error. Columns (3) and (4) 
show the forecast errors of the two naïve models. The naïve lag model uses actual 
revenue at time ti-1 as a forecast for actual revenue at time ti, while the naïve trend model 
reflects the difference between actual revenue and the results of a simple univariate 
regression fitted on past revenue values.  
Finally, columns (5) and (6) show the difference between the forecasters’ actual 
MAPE error and the MAPE error generated by each of the naïve models. A positive value 
in those cells indicates that the state forecasters’ projections fit the actual revenue better 
than the naïve model; a negative value shows that the naïve model surpassed the 
forecasters’ projections in accuracy; and a value near zero means that the state 
forecasters’ projections and the naïve model came to very similar estimates. In the case of 
North Dakota, both cells in columns (5) and (6) are negative, indicating that the naïve 
models performed far better. The forecasters in North Dakota did not add additional value 
in terms of accuracy to what extant economic trends already indicated—the forecasters 
could not anticipate the additional revenues generated by the sudden energy boom. In 
contrast, the national average state forecast error tracked the two naïve models more 























North Dakota -15.36% 30.86% 23.29% 27.51% -7.57% -3.35% 
National Average 4.58% 18.97% 17.08% 21.71% -1.89% 2.74% 
Table 3. Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), Mean Percentage Error (MPE), Naïve Models 
(1) and (2), and Forecaster comparisons (3) and (4) for state corporate income tax receipts, 2007-
2001.  
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1. Comparing Consensus and Non-Consensus States 
Behavioral economics would tend to predict worse performance from deliberative 
groups in consensus estimation states, where representatives of multiple agencies or 
branches of government must meet and generally deliberate before adopting a starting 
figure for the budget. The literature would tend to predict that a single individual or entity 
would produce a more accurate output, unbiased by social pressures or inefficient use of 
information endemic to deliberative groups. At best, if the judgment of multiple people 
must be aggregated, Sunstein (2005) advocates instead for the superior accuracy of 
statistical groups or information markets, in which individuals submit their opinion with 
no opportunity to discuss with others.  
The methods non-consensus states use to settle on a revenue estimate bear some 
similarity to statistical groups or information markets. For instance, in some states 
separate branches of government produce revenue estimates, with a governor and a 
legislature submitting divergent projections of total tax collections. New Jersey, for 
instance, has a system in which the branches separately come to conclusions about an 
appropriate revenue estimate. The Governor presents a budget estimate to the legislature, 
which then reviews and adjusts these estimates.107 However, the legislature’s power is 
strictly limited, as the Governor has the power to modify the appropriations bill through 
line-item veto and sole authority to certify the budget.108 The process is contentious, with 
                                                 
107 Richard F. Keevey, Budget Basics: How the State Budget is Developed and Revenue 
Estimated, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Oct. 13, 2017) http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/17/10/12/budget-
basics-how-the-state-budget-is-developed-and-revenue-estimated/.  
108 Id.  
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occasional gaps between the two branches’ determinations, and the rules do not 
especially incentivize a discursive rapport between the legislature and the governor.109 
However, returning to behavioral economics, increasing discourse could have the effect 
of biasing the independent determinations of the legislators and the governor. Hypothesis 
1 posits that non-consensus states, especially in the executive and separate branch 
systems, may perform better and more accurately than consensus-based states in revenue 
estimation.  
Table 5 sets up a comparison between the forecasting performance of consensus 
states and non-consensus states. Consensus state forecasters did make larger errors in 
estimating corporate income tax revenue than non-consensus forecasters. Both types of 
forecasters overestimated incoming revenue during this time, as indicated by the positive 
sign on the MPE estimates, but consensus forecasters did so by a larger margin per the 
MPE and MAPE averages. In addition, while both types of forecasters underperformed 
                                                 


































18 6.34% 19.24% 15.66% 22.37% -3.58% 3.13% 
Non-
Consensus 
16 3.17% 15.18% 14.52% 16.46% -0.66% 1.28% 
Table 4. Comparison of Consensus States and Non-Consensus States in Estimating the Corporate 
Income Tax, 2007-2011. 
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relative to the naïve lag model, non-consensus states performed much closer to the 
model’s estimate, although consensus state forecasters achieved more accuracy than the  
naïve trend model. On the whole, though, this table tends to support the assertion of 
Hypothesis 1 that non-consensus groups will tend to outperform consensus-based groups. 
For a more granular picture, Table 6 disaggregates the non-consensus category 
into executive branch and separate branch subcategories. Of the three types, executive 
branch states performed best, with consistently small error estimates across the table. The 
executive branch MPE estimate carries a negative sign, meaning that this category of 
states alone was successful in underestimating, rather than overestimating, revenue. 
Consensus states once again err by a greater margin than both other categories, and once 
again underperform relative to the naïve lag model by a wider margin than either 











































11 4.99% 15.00% 14.42% 16.62% -0.58% 1.62% 
Table 5.  Comparison of Consensus States, Executive Branch States, and Separate Branch States in 
Estimating the Corporate Income Tax, 2007-2011.  
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In some ways, though these findings are preliminary and require significance 
testing, the shortcomings of the consensus model are not surprising. Boyd and Dadayan 
(2014) note in their review of the literature and investigation of consensus process error 
that consensus forecasts do not yield particular accuracy. Even if consensus processes do 
not promise additional accuracy, they may yet be more desirable than executive and 
separate branch systems for other reasons. Separate branch systems often cause citizens 
frustration over the time spent debating revenue instead of policy matters. 110 Moreover, 
advocates claim a correlation between consensus forecasting and higher credit ratings, 
suggesting that ratings agencies give better ratings to consensus forecasting states.111  
2. Comparing Consensus Group States 
Decisional rules in a group can change the group’s dynamic and the willingness 
of minority party members to speak up, to everyone’s benefit or detriment. Hypothesis 2 
                                                 
110 Id., see also McNichol, supra note 3, at 5 (“in 2009, when Connecticut had a Republican 
governor and Democratic legislature, it took weeks—which could have been spent debating 
policy—to agree on a base revenue estimate”); Tebbs, supra note 40, at 1 (“As a result of this 
impasse, Connecticut’s political leaders have wasted weeks wrangling over the size of the deficit 
rather than the difficult policy decisions necessary to bring the budget into balance”). 




























Unanimous 8.67% 21.61% 16.34% 24.01% -5.27% 2.40% 
Majority 4.00% 22.48% 18.99% 23.65% -3.49% 1.17% 
Table 6. Comparing Unanimous and Majority Rule Consensus States’ Accuracy in Estimating 
the Corporate Income Tax, 2007-2011 
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argued that groups operating under a majoritarian system would produce more accurate 
predictions, as individual members would feel less constrained by a unanimity 
requirement and contribute better information.  
In fact, Table 7 shows there is only very limited difference between the 
unanimous and majority error terms. Both the MPEs are positive, meaning the forecaster 
projected more revenue than actual collections. Majoritarian groups have a slightly larger 
absolute error, but the error terms for unanimous and majoritarian groups track each other 
closely. Neither group outperforms the basic naïve lag model, but both groups perform 
better than the naïve trend estimates.  
 Finally, Hypothesis 3 posited that larger consensus groups would produce less 
accurate revenue estimates than smaller groups, as a result of distortions like information 
cascades which are more likely to be experienced by larger groups. Consensus 
forecasting groups do not vary in size too greatly. Groups range from three to nine 
panelists, with the exception of Delaware, which uses a 30-person panel.  
Table 8 shows the average errors experienced by panels of varying sizes. The first 
two rows take the average of all consensus states, with the exception of the outlier 
Delaware for the second row. The next five rows show the average errors for states using 
at each size band, from 3 to 7 panelists. The final two rows split the consensus states in 
two categories: relatively smaller panels of 3 or 4 panelists, and relatively larger panels of 
5 to 9 panelists. The third column lists the number of states per category.  
The findings from Table 8 tentatively confirm that larger states tend to experience 
bigger errors. Accuracy generally decreased as panel size increased, with the least 
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accurate results from states with 6 panelists (although that category only contains two 
states, Kentucky and New York). Comparing the relatively smaller states of 3 or 4 
panelists to the larger states with 5 to 9 panelists again shows that the relatively smaller 
states outperform larger states, with a smaller MPE of 6.91 percent and MAPE of 19.08 
percent compared to larger panels with an MPE and MAPE of 9.25 percent and 24.15 
percent respectively. Smaller states outperformed both naïve models, while larger states 




The behavioral economics literature shows that estimative deliberative groups 
tend to produce biased, inaccurate outputs. Deliberative groups are more likely to 
Table 7. Comparing Consensus State Panel Sizes and Relative Accuracy in Estimating the Corporate 





























outliers) 5.87 23 7.05% 21.91% 17.26% 23.88% -4.65% 1.97% 
All States 
(except 
outliers) 4.77 22 7.97% 21.38% 16.70% 23.38% -4.68% 2.00% 
3 Panelists 3 5 1.67% 11.74% 12.60% 14.49% 0.86% 2.75% 
4 Panelists 4 6 11.21% 24.36% 16.49% 21.94% -7.86% -2.41% 
5 Panelists 5 3 -1.00% 20.72% 18.66% 21.59% -2.06% 0.87% 
6 Panelists 6 2 31.21% 37.87% 15.06% 52.80% -22.81% 14.94% 
7 Panelists 7 3 11.79% 28.61% 21.60% 30.59% -7.01% 1.98% 
3-4 
Panelists 3.54 12 6.91% 19.08% 16.37% 18.88% -2.71% -0.20% 
5-9 
Panelists 6.25 10 9.25% 24.15% 17.11% 28.79% -7.05% 4.63% 
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experience distortions for a number of reasons: cascade effects, in which the information 
or opinions raised earliest carry more weight; amplification of individuals’ existing 
biases; polarization in favor of the most extreme opinions or opinions with the highest 
number of arguments in their favor; and weighting common knowledge held by the group 
over information held by individual members. These problems lead deliberative groups to 
systematically produce outputs that are more biased than outputs produced by 
individuals, and also underperform relative to other aggregation methods like statistical 
groups or information markets.  
Consensus forecasting states use a process most similar to the deliberative group 
method tested by the behavioral economics literature. Consensus forecasting states use a 
process in which representatives from multiple branches of government meet in 
deliberative groups to settle on a single revenue forecast. These states contrast with 
executive forecasting states, in which the executive branch alone produces the forecast 
(usually through the governor’s office or a dedicated budget agency) and states in which 
separate branches of government produce the forecast. Within the consensus forecasting 
category, groups have different characteristics, differing in terms of size, makeup, 
decisional standard, and other factors.  
1. Overview of Findings 
The analysis examined differences in accuracy between consensus and non-
consensus states as well as within the consensus state category, measuring estimators’ 
performance against data for the most difficult revenue stream to estimate: corporate 
income taxes during the Great Recession. This section also compared estimators’ 
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performance during this time to two naïve models of estimate error. The average state 
forecaster did not estimate corporate income tax more accurately than a naïve model 
using a lagged variable, although they outperformed a naïve model predicting revenue 
according to a simple linear trend.  
Analysis demonstrated some limited evidence exists for the propositions that 
consensus groups will underperform non-consensus groups and that certain types of 
consensus groups will outperform other types. One of the findings of this paper was that 
consensus groups do not, on average, produce estimates any more accurate than states 
that have the executive branch or separate branches of government estimate tax 
collections. In accordance with predictions generated by the behavioral economics 
literature, consensus groups requiring unanimity outperformed majoritarian groups and 
smaller consensus groups performed better than larger consensus groups.  
2. Directions for Future Research  
There are several further directions for research coming out of this paper. These 
findings, while interesting, requires a more robust test of its statistical significance and of 
the magnitude of the difference. Econometric modeling would help determine whether 
the relationship between these characteristics and forecasting accuracy is causal rather 
than merely associational. Perhaps future researchers can run experiments involving state 
forecasters to test claims in the behavioral economics literature that statistical groups and 
information markets outperform deliberative groups. will begin to experiment with some 
of the alternatives to deliberative groups, such as information markets or statistical 
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groups. As all streams of revenue continue to increase in volatility, states need a stable 
and accurate source of information about their financial future. 
3. Guidance for Policymakers 
Policymakers tasked with designing institutions responsible for estimating 
revenue can draw on some of the findings above to maximize chances of estimate 
accuracy. These recommendations are made on the assumption that findings based on 
data drawn from recessionary years focusing on a single revenue stream generalize to 
other revenue estimation contexts.  
First, policymakers should consider tasking revenue estimation to the executive 
branch alone or sharing the responsibility between executive and legislative branches, 
rather than relying on consensus groups to forecast revenue. Consensus groups produce 
larger misestimates than both executive and separate branch states, and also 
underperform relative to a basic naïve lag model by a greater magnitude.  
This recommendation has some caveats. Notably, accuracy is not the only factor 
used to determine the desirability of different types of forecasting models. Lawmakers 
may also wish to ensure that a given revenue forecast is politically accepted by all major 
players in the budgetary process. Mikesell and Ross show that consensus-based 
forecasting may generate broad-based political buy-in for the revenue estimate, making 
the final estimate less likely to be assailed by other branches of government.112 
Consensus-based forecasting may deliver additional benefits—for instance, advocates 
                                                 
112 Mikesell & Ross, supra note 25, at 200. 
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claim that an association exists between higher credit ratings and consensus-based 
forecasts, although this association is correlational rather than causal.113 Finally, citizens 
may prefer executive branch forecasting to separate branch forecasting, as the latter can 
cause citizens frustrations with the protracted public wrangling over the budget.114  
Second, if policymakers choose to continue using consensus groups to estimate 
revenue, they can maximize accuracy by tweaking some of the features of those groups. 
Consensus group states experience the lowest error terms with 3 to 4 panelists; more 
specifically, groups with 3 panelists demonstrate the lowest percentage of error. Finally, 
for greatest accuracy policymakers should permit these groups should use a majoritarian 
decision rule rather than requiring unanimous agreement.   
                                                 
113 Tebbs, supra note 40, at 3.  
114 McNichol, supra note 3, at 5 (“in 2009, when Connecticut had a Republican governor and 
Democratic legislature, it took weeks—which could have been spent debating policy—to agree 
on a base revenue estimate”); Tebbs, supra note 40, at 1 (“As a result of this impasse, 
Connecticut’s political leaders have wasted weeks wrangling over the size of the deficit rather 
than the difficult policy decisions necessary to bring the budget into balance”). 
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Conclusion 
State budget writers rely on accurate revenue estimates from forecasters. 
Overestimating the amount of incoming revenue can lead to service cuts or tax increases 
in states with balanced budget requirements, while underestimating revenue may result in 
collecting more taxes from citizens than state governments need. This report 
demonstrates that behavioral economics insights showing that deliberative groups 
perform poorly on tasks requiring accuracy hold true for revenue estimation groups too. 
Consensus-based groups consisting of representatives from multiple branches of 
government performed with less accuracy than non-consensus-based forecasting models. 
Within the category of consensus-based groups, smaller groups and majoritarian groups 
outperformed bigger groups and unanimous groups respectively, confirming predictions 
generated by the behavioral economics literature. These insights can help inform 





Appendix A: State Revenue Estimation Typology 
 
Several sources have compiled various lists categorizing states’ revenue estimation 
practices. The list below was drawn out of three sources: Krause and Douglas (2013), 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS (2015), and McNichol (2014). 
Where all 3 sources agree that a state uses a consensus process, that state is classified as 
“consensus.” Where McNichol (2014) classifies a state as executive branch or separate 
branches and no other sources claim the state belongs in a different category, that state is 
assigned to executive or separate branch categories below. For the remaining states, the 
sources offer conflicting guidance on typology, so they remain unclassified.   
 







Delaware Arkansas Alabama Alaska 
Florida Georgia Arizona Connecticut 
Indiana Minnesota California Hawaii 
Iowa Oregon Colorado Louisiana  
Kansas Texas Idaho Mississippi 
Kentucky West Virginia Illinois Nevada 





Massachusetts  New Jersey Ohio 
Michigan  Pennsylvania Oklahoma 
Missouri  Wisconsin Utah 
Nebraska   Virginia 
New Mexico   Washington 
New York   Wyoming  
Rhode Island    
South Carolina    
Tennessee    




George A. Krause and James W. Douglas, Organizational Structure and the Optimal 
Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commissions’ Revenue 
Forecasts in the American States, 57 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 135, 143 (2013). 
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, Budget Processes in the States, 




Elizabeth C. McNichol, Improving State Revenue Forecasting: Best Practices for a More 
Trusted and Reliable Revenue Estimate, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 1-3 
(Sep. 4, 2014) https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-7-14sfp.pdf.  
 52 
Appendix B: Forecast Error Tables 
 
The following tables include state-level data on forecaster error during the Great 
Recession, as self-reported from The Fiscal Survey of the States compiled by the National 
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO).  
 














Alabama 6.72% 9.06% 20.83% 
Alaska N/A N/A 2.75% 
Arizona 10.26% 12.84% 20.82% 
Arkansas 3.69% 0.89% -5.60% 
California 3.75% 5.43% 1.09% 
Colorado 4.41% 1.62% 1.80% 
Connecticut 3.06% 3.44% 15.58% 
Delaware N/A 5.75% -24.71% 
Florida 6.69% N/A 6.82% 
Georgia 4.84% 7.28% -3.40% 
Hawaii 1.99% 4.69% 24.02% 
Idaho 4.35% 0.93% 19.67% 
Illinois 3.41% 2.15% 1.73% 
Indiana 3.96% 6.19% 18.46% 
Iowa -2.17% -14.19% -1.78% 
Kansas 1.09% 2.55% 1.07% 
Kentucky 3.91% 3.89% 81.04% 
Louisiana 2.40% -4.21% 31.86% 
Maine 0.76% -0.24% -2.93% 
Maryland 3.59% 4.00% 2.27% 
Massachusetts 3.70% 3.17% -2.28% 
Michigan 2.27% 3.83% 10.97% 
Minnesota 1.31% 4.05% 5.61% 
Mississippi 3.71% 3.42% 5.21% 
Missouri 4.59% 6.89% 18.90% 
Montana -2.45% 6.97% 16.23% 
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Nebraska 0.67% 1.02% 4.27% 
Nevada 13.05% N/A N/A 
New Hampshire N/A N/A 8.70% 
New Jersey 3.96% 2.02% 1.69% 
New Mexico 6.09% 8.68% 46.05% 
New York 2.40% 4.04% 7.29% 
North Carolina 3.36% 6.19% 4.54% 
North Dakota -6.94% -7.76% -3.93% 
Ohio 2.52% 2.78% 6.10% 
Oklahoma 4.27% 7.52% 42.21% 
Oregon N/A 8.21% 16.79% 
Pennsylvania 2.73% 2.94% 6.53% 
Rhode Island 2.75% 3.89% 8.29% 
South Carolina 5.98% 6.66% 14.37% 
South Dakota 0.87% N/A N/A 
Tennessee 4.36% 5.29% 7.91% 
Texas 0.36% N/A N/A 
Utah 5.82% 3.68% 11.39% 
Vermont 3.87% 1.06% -6.99% 
Virginia 4.22% 4.29% 4.26% 
Washington 6.94% N/A N/A 
West Virginia 3.71% -1.10% 1.99% 
Wisconsin 4.54% 3.95% 6.34% 
Wyoming -3.55% N/A N/A 
Mean MPE 3.30% 3.42% 10.09% 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.03 0.05 0.17 
75th Percentile 4.39% 6.08% 16.23% 
Median MPE 3.70% 3.89% 6.34% 
25th Percentile  2.30% 2.05% 1.73% 
n 318 291 313 
Source: NASBO AND NATIONAL GOVERNORS 




































Alabama 12.44% 28.71% 20.27% 23.11% -8.44% -5.61% 
Alaska -2.83% 20.40% 14.57% 17.46% -5.84% -2.94% 
Arizona 15.90% 20.69% 15.17% 28.69% -5.52% 8.00% 
Arkansas -3.93% 9.26% 8.13% 6.54% -1.14% -2.72% 
California 0.40% 8.02% 19.56% 9.45% 11.54% 1.43% 
Colorado 1.31% 13.12% 11.11% 16.68% -2.01% 3.56% 
Connecticut 8.69% 15.54% 9.96% 10.49% -5.58% -5.05% 
Delaware -13.34% 33.55% 29.59% 34.88% -3.96% 1.33% 
Florida 4.50% 12.82% 6.80% 16.69% -6.02% 3.87% 
Georgia -6.37% 10.08% 12.28% 14.44% 2.20% 4.36% 
Hawaii 16.34% 29.57% 22.52% 32.11% -7.05% 2.54% 
Idaho 13.43% 17.17% 16.23% 17.36% -0.94% 0.19% 
Illinois 1.19% 11.46% 16.75% 16.57% 5.30% 5.11% 
Indiana 10.32% 19.17% 13.06% 33.38% -6.11% 14.21% 
Iowa -7.27% 13.25% 10.96% 11.95% -2.29% -1.30% 
Kansas -1.76% 7.71% 15.24% 15.78% 7.53% 8.07% 
Kentucky 60.09% 65.97% 24.80% 95.90% -41.17% 29.92% 
Louisiana 13.74% 46.59% 43.30% 40.83% -3.28% -5.76% 
Maine -4.73% 13.01% 9.29% 13.36% -3.72% 0.36% 
Maryland 5.74% 13.56% 8.79% 19.33% -4.77% 5.77% 
Massachusett
s 
-5.11% 8.86% 18.20% 11.78% 9.35% 2.92% 
Michigan 9.09% 9.09% 9.22% 14.19% 0.12% 5.10% 
Minnesota 1.62% 25.32% 20.16% 21.14% -5.16% -4.18% 
Mississippi -0.02% 12.49% 7.73% 12.27% -4.77% -0.22% 
Missouri 12.44% 20.10% 8.69% 15.85% -11.41% -4.24% 
Montana 3.45% 22.99% 19.42% 18.54% -3.58% -4.45% 
Nebraska 2.45% 4.81% 10.90% 12.35% 6.08% 7.54% 
New 
Hampshire 
4.95% 10.19% 13.19% 10.86% 3.00% 0.67% 
New Jersey -1.10% 8.64% 9.05% 22.83% 0.41% 14.19% 
New Mexico 31.07% 43.11% 25.01% 35.93% -18.09% -7.18% 
New York 2.34% 9.76% 5.31% 9.71% -4.45% -0.05% 
North 
Carolina 
-2.19% 18.70% 18.02% 8.59% -0.68% -10.11% 
North Dakota -15.36% 30.86% 23.29% 27.51% -7.57% -3.35% 
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Ohio 1.18% 13.77% 64.53% 91.79% 50.75% 78.02% 
Oklahoma 20.79% 48.55% 27.04% 43.88% -21.52% -4.67% 
Oregon 5.07% 26.86% 19.43% 25.77% -7.43% -1.09% 
Pennsylvania 3.41% 6.83% 6.10% 9.17% -0.73% 2.33% 
Rhode Island 5.86% 13.95% 15.85% 15.20% 1.90% 1.25% 
South 
Carolina 
7.30% 24.07% 34.41% 22.43% 10.34% -1.64% 
Tennessee 5.54% 11.03% 7.42% 10.09% -3.61% -0.93% 
Utah 0.59% 21.03% 17.30% 19.69% -3.73% -1.34% 
Vermont -10.48% 22.59% 28.36% 13.92% 5.77% -8.67% 
Virginia 0.53% 6.89% 6.27% 6.21% -0.63% -0.68% 
West Virginia -0.50% 6.35% 13.71% 12.68% 7.36% 6.33% 
Wisconsin -0.47% 17.23% 11.81% 9.62% -5.42% -7.61% 
National 
Average 
4.58% 18.97% 17.08% 21.71% -1.89% 2.74% 
Source: NASBO AND NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, The Fiscal Survey of States, 
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